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Probabilistic Interpretations lor MYCIN's Certainty Factors 
Davld Heckerman 
Medical Computer Science Group, TCI35, Stanrord University Medical Center 
Abstract 
\Ve propose a redefinition of the quantities called 
certainty factors used by MYCIN to manage 
uncertainty. This definition is based on the 
de5iderata of certainty factors given in the original 
work. It is emphasized that this definition reflects 
the not ion that certaint.y factors represent chanf1'8 in 
belief about hypot.heses given evidence as opposed to 
abBolute beliefs. It is shown that this redefinition 
accommodates an infinite number of probabilistic 
interpretations. In constructing the Interpretations, 
insight is provided into the assumptions made when 
propagating certainty factors through an inference 
net. For example, it is shown that all evidence which 
bears directly on a hypothesis must be conditionally 
independent on t.he hypothesis and its negation. 
Also, this analysis demonstrates that certainty 
factors must be elicited from experts in a precise 
fashion and a straightforward method for doing so is 
presented. Improvements in the methods currently 
used to propagate certainty factors through an 
inference net w ill also be suggested. 
Introduction 
Many AI researchers have created ad hoc strategies for 
rea.•oning under uncertainty. They have invariably explained 
their approaches a.s necessary because of limitations of 
probability theoryl. 2. Many familiar with probability theory, 
however, argue that ad hoc methods for dealing with 
uncertainty are unnecessary and that probabilistic methods are 
sufficient in all cases3• •· 5• 6•1. In this paper, we will focus on 
the l\1YCIN certa inty factor model1, a purportedly ad hoc 
method for managing uncertainty that has seen wide use in 
rule-based expert systems. Shortliffe and Buchanan, creators of 
the model, justify t.he use of certainty factors by demonstrating 
system performance equal to that of experts in the field8. 
However. since they failed to provide a precise characterization 
of certainty factors, a good deal of mystery and confusion about 
the numbers has been generated. In this paper, we will clear up 
much of this mystery by showing that there are probabilistic 
interpretations for certainty factors. By demonstrating an 
equ iva len ce between certainty factors and probabilities we will 
also lend support to the arguments that probability theory is 
sufficient for reasoning under uncertainty. 
Previous Work 
This work is not the first to attempt to gain a better 
understanding or certainty factors. Adamso demonstrated 
several problems with the original definition of certainty 
fa�tors. In an unpublished internal memo10, Duda, Hart, 
. 
This work "'" supported in part by lhe Josiah Maey, Jr. f'ound&lion and lhe 
H�nry J. Kai5=er Family Foundation. 
Nilsson and Shortliffe proposed several new putative 
probabilistic interpretations but admittedly failed to acquire 
significant new insights into the certainty factor model. In fact, 
none of their interpretations fulfill the criteria for a 
probabilistic interpretation proposed below. Later, Duda 
demonstrated a strong similarity between the certainty factor 
model and the pseudo-probabilistic method used in the expert 
syst.em PROSPECTOR to manage uncertainty11• We will 
consider this similarity in a new light. Finally, Hajek12 
examined the algebraic properties of certainty factors without 
attempt ing a probabilistic interpretation. The significance of 
his work within the current context will be discussed. 
MYCIN's Certainty Factors 
Before examining probabilistic interpretations for MYCIN's 
certainty factors, we present a simplified overview of the 
quantities. 1\fYCIN's knowledge is stored as ru/,6. Rules are of 
the form IF widence THEN hvpothe�Jis. In this paper, rules 
wiJI be re·presented by 
E ----------- > H 
where H is a hypothesis and E is evidence relating to tbe 
hypothesis. For example, a hypothesis might be that the 
organism Slaphvlococrus is infecting a patient while evidence 
for t-his hypot.hesis might be that the organism is gram-positive 
and grows in clumps. 
In medicine, relat-ionships between evidence and hypotheses 
are often uncertain. In order to accommodate these non­
deterministic relationships, MYCIN uses certainty factors. To 
each rule, a certainty factor is attached which represents the 
change in belief about a hypothesis given some evidence. In 
this paper, we write 
CF(H. E) 
E ----------- > H 
Certainty fa.ctors range between -1 and 1. Positive numbers 
correspond to an incr,as' In belief in a hypothesis while 
negative quantities correspond to a dureas' in belief. Note 
that certainty factors do not correspond to measures of 
ahsolut' belief. This has been a source or confusion with 
'respect to certainty factors as well as other measures of 
uncertainty13. 
In MYCIN, it is possible that several pieces of evidence bear 
on the same hypothesis. It is also possible for a hypothesis to 
serve as evidence for another hypothesis. A interconnected set 
of hypotheses and evidence is called an in/er,net ndwork14. 
Figure 1 depicts one possible net. In the figure, Si is a 
statement which serves as either evidence or a hypothesis or 
sometimes both. 
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Figure 1: An inference net 
Now let us examine the mechanisms used In MYCIN to 
propagate certainty factors through an inference net. In the 
certainty factor model. t.he propagation of belief is defined for 
two elementary inference nets. Propagation through a complex 
network is accomplished by decomposing the net Into 
elementary structures where propagation Is straightforward. 
The first. of these e lementary networks is diagramed below. 
Here. two pieces of evidence bear on the same hypothesis. In 
MYCIN, these two rules are combined into an effective single 
rule with certainty factor CF(H,E1E2) equal to 
CF(H,E1}<cF(H.�)-CF(H,E1)CF(H,�) if CF(H,E1),CF(H.�)>O, (1) 
CF(H,E1)•CF(H.�)•CF(H,E1)CF(H.�) If CF(H,E1),CF(H,�)<O, 
CF(H,E1) • CF(H,E2) 
------------------·---------- othervise. 
1- lllin(jCF(I'l,E1), Cf(H.fh)l) 
\\'e will refer to thill pro>tess as parallel combination. 
In the second elementary network, a hypothesis serves as 
evidence for another hypothesis. Diagrammatically, we have 
CF(E,E') CF(H,E) 
E' ----------> E ----------- > H 
where E' is certain but E and H may not be certain. These two 
rules are combined into an effective single rule with a certainty 
factor denot.ed by CF(H,E') where 
CF(H,E') = CF(H,E) aax(o, CF(E,E')). (2) 
This will be called sequential combination. 
To see how these combination formulas can be used to 
propagate certainty factors in more complicated situations, 
consider the following example: 
LlJCES PARTIES � 
. Ln�ES SOLO _/'! 
IACXPACI:ING /..5 
TJIIPS 
EIT�T . 4 
I)OU 
----SOCIAL 
YOU: 
That is, if a person likes to go to parties, then the change In 
belief that he Is an extrovert is .8. Ir he likes to make solo 
backparkin� trips, the chan�e in belief that he is an extrovert Is 
-.5. Furthermore, if a person is an extrovert, then the change 
in belief that he participates in some type of social work is .4. 
To compute the change in belief that a person Is an extrovert 
given that he likfs to go to parties and also likes t.o make solo 
backpacking trips, we use the parallel combination function (1) 
wit.h CF(H,E1) .8 and CF(H,E2) ·.5 g1vmg 
CF(H,E1E2) = .8- .5 I 1 - .5 = .6 . To compute the change in 
belief that a person does some type of social work given that he 
likes to go to parties and also likes to make solo backpacking 
trips, we use the sequential combination function (2) with 
CF(E.E') = .6 (the result of parallel combination) and 
CF(H,E) = .4 giving CF(H,E') = (.6X.4) = .24. 
This decompositlonal approach to propagation is 
straightforward when an Inference net has a tree structure. 
However, MYCIN's inference net is not a tree and additional ad 
hoc procedures were introduced to handle complexities such as 
multiple paths from evidence to hypothesis. To :simplify this 
discussion, we will only consider tree networks
". 
Overview of Interpretation development 
As mentioned above, the certainty factor CF(H,E) represents 
the change In belief of a hypothesis H based on the evidence 
E. In the original work1, the creators of certainty factors 
presented this basic notion and then immediately proposed a 
formal definition of certainty factors In terms of probabilities. 
In somewhat simplified form and In our notation, Shortliffe and 
Buchanrn gave as thf definition of CF(H,E): 
p(HIE) - p(H) 
p(HjE) > p(H) -------------
1 - p(H) 
CF(H,E) (3) 
P(HIE) - p(H) 
p(H) > p(HjE) -------------
p(H) 
Given this definition, however, they could not derive exact 
formulae for combining certainty factors (we will give one 
reason for this difficulty In a later section). Instead, they 
proposed "approximate" combination functions. They justified 
these functions by showing that they satisfied certain properties 
or "desiderata" which are consistent with the basic notion or 
certainty factors. For example, one or the desiderata is that 
parallel combination must not depend on the order in which 
evidence Is
' 
prestnted. We will examine these properties in 
detail shortly. 
Much of the efforts that have gone Into trying to understand 
MYCIN's certainty factors have focused on problems with the 
origina l deflnition8• In this paper, we take a different approach; 
rather tban define certainty factors in terms or probabilities, we 
define tbem In terms of the desiderata outlined in the original 
work. That Is, we take the desiderata t.o be the defining 
a:rioms of certainty factors. We then look for combinations of 
probabilistic quantities In the spirit or (3) which are consistent 
with these axioms. These combinations are probabilistic 
interpretations for certainty factors defined In this new way. 
VVe use these Interpretations to gain new insight Into the use of 
certainty factors to manage uncertainty . 
To proceed, It is important to make two distinctions. The 
'irst Is the distinction between the combination functions used 
'lY MYCIN and t.he desiderata or defining axioms. To highlight 
rh!s distinction, the symbol ..1 or the phrase " certainty factor" 
will be used to refer to any quantity which satisfies the new 
lefinition of certainty factors while t.he term "CF" will refer to 
rertainty fa.ct.ors that are combined with the MYCIN functions. 
The symbol .:1 was chosen to emphasize that the quantity 
represents a belief update. A second distinction is made 
between cert.�lnty fartors In gener;d �nd prtic11br prob:<hili'lir 
0 Pearl16 civeo a detailed discussion or belief propacation �hroucb more 
eomplieated uetworks 
10 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
interpretations that may be ascribed to them. To highlight this 
distinction. a subscripted ..:1, e.g . ..:11• will refer to a particular 
probabili:-tic interpretat ion. 
Formal properties or certainty ractors 
\\'e begin the construction of probabilistic Interpretations for 
certa inty factors by closely examining the desiderata or defining 
axioms. To understand these axioms, It is important to 
remembH that ..l(H.E) represents the change in belief of 
hypothesis H given evidence E. In other words, ..:1 is a belief 
update. The defining axioms fall into three categories: (1) basic 
properties not related to the combination functions. (2) 
properties of parallel combination. and (3) properties of 
sequential combinaUon. Since sequential combination !s 
somewhat more complicated than parallel combination, we will 
first discuss categories one and two and return to category 
three later. 
Bas ic � 
There are only two basic axioms or certainty factors. The 
first states that .1's are real numbers in the interval [-1,1j. The 
serond states that ..:l's are ordered by the usual 11 < 11 relation 
on real numbers; that is, it makes sense to say that one 
certa inty factor is less than another. 
Axioms £! parallel combination 
The first axiom of parallel combination was not made explicit 
in the original work. Consider two rules with the same 
hypothesis H 
E -------- > H 
E' -------- > H 
It is possible that the update ..:l(H.E) may depend on whether or 
not E' is known. In general, the update ..:l(H.E) may depend on 
evidence for H already known. Therefore. certainty factors 
logically must have three arguments: H. E and e where e 
denotes prior evidence for H. However, the creators of certainty 
factor5 omitted the third argument, implicitly assuming that an 
an updat e is  independent of previous updates. This was done 
so that rules would reta i n  a modular character
1
8. Formally, the 
first axiom of parallel combination is 
..l(H,E,e) = ..l(H,E,0) := ..:l(H,E) ( 4) 
for enry e w h ich does not entail E. This axiom will be called 
the modularity axiom. \\'e will see later that it corresponds to 
the assumption of condit-ional independence. 
As mention ed above, the parallel combination or two pieces of 
evidence E1 and E2 w ith respect to a hypothesis H is denoted 
..liH.E1E2). Given this notation, ..:l's are required to be 
associativE' 
(s) 
and commutative 
(6) 
In other words. updating belief should not depend on how 
evidence is grouped or on the order in which It combined. 
It is required that parallel combination preserves the ordering 
of updates. Suppose we have one update greater than another, 
that is ..l(H.E1) > .:l(H.E2). When we combine each or these 
With a third update .1(H.E3), we want the two resulting updates 
to have the same relationship. Namely, 
(7) 
Another axiom or parallel combination states that 0 is a 
special certainty factor. In particular, If .d.(ll,E) Is o, the 
evidence E does not change the belief in hypothesis H. This 
corresponds to a "no information 11 situation. In our notation, 
(a) 
for all E2. In other words, 0 Is the Identity element with 
respect to parallel combination. 
The next property of certainty factors we will discuss was not 
considered a desideratum in the original work. Rather, it was 
shown to follow from the definition of the MYCIN parallel 
combination. \Ve will upgrade this property to an axiom. 
Informally the axiom states that If ..:l(H,E) corresponds to the 
increase in belief of H given E, then -..:l(H,E) should correspond 
to an equal and opposite dureau in belief. Formally, 
(9) 
That is, every cntainty factor has an inverse with respect to 
parallel combination and it's inverse is just the certainty factor 
with opposite sign. 
Finall�·. combination of "extreme" certainty factors must be 
consistent with the notion that a ..:l(H.E) or 1 corresponds to the 
rase where E proves H and a ..:l(H.E) or -1 corresponds to the 
situation where H is disproved by E. 
if ..:1(H,E1) 1 and ..l(H.E:!) <> -1 then .:l(H,E1E:!) 
if ..l(H,E1) -1 and ..:l(H.�) <> 1 then .:1(H,E1�) -1 (to) 
if ..:1(H,E1) 1 and .1(H,E:!) = -1 then ..:1(H,E1E:!) 
is undefined 
The last case corresponds to conflicting evidence where E1 
proves H while E2 disproves H. 
Requirements or a probabilistic interpretation 
Intuitively, a probabilist.ic interpretation for certainty factors 
is a eombination or probabilistic quantities, in the spirit. or (3), 
which satisfies the defin ing axioms. In this section, we will 
formalize this notion. 
First. we requ ire that. there is some runction t such that 
.:l(H.E) = f(p(HIE), p(H)) (11) 
where p(H!El denotes the conditional probability of H given E, 
the posterior probab ility or H. and p(H) denotes the probability 
or H before E Is known, the prior probability. The only 
restrictions we place on f here is that it be a smooth function • . 
Later we will see that the axioms or certainty factors place 
much tight.er restrictions on f. For later discussion, it is useful 
to state the above requirement with explicit reference to prior 
evidence e: 
LI(H,E,e) = f(p(H!Ee), p(Hje)). (12) 
In addition to the above basic requirement, a probabilistic 
lnterpret.ation should be order preserving. In other words, 
suppose one update Is greater than another. Given the same 
prior probability, the posterior probability corresponding to the 
first update should be greater than the posterior corresponding 
to the second. More formally, 
..:1(H,E1) < ..l(H,E:!) iff P(HjE1) < p(Hj�) 
w ith p(H) fixed. 
( 13) 
Finally, a probabilist.ic int.erpretation should be consistent 
with the notion that ..:l(H.E) = 1 when H follows from E and 
..:l(H.E) = -1 when E disproves H. 
..l(H,E) = 1 iff (p(HjE) = 1 and p(H) <> o) 
..:l(H,E) = 0 iff (p(H!E) = o and p(H) <> 1) 
• 
Prtei!!f'ly, thr first derivative of r must exist and be eontinuous. 
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The original interpretation of certainty 
factors 
In this section, we examine the original definition (3) of 
certalnt.y factors. Here, we view (3) as a probabilistic 
int.erpret.at.lon for certainty factors rather than a. definition. To 
emphasize this we write 
p(H j E) • P(H) 
p(HjE) > p(H) -------------
1 · p{H) 
,jor1i(H,E) ( 15) 
p(HjE) · p(H) 
p(H) > p(HjE) -------------
p(H) 
There are several problems with this putative Interpretation. 
Here. it is shown thai (15) dictates non-commutative parallel 
combination of eYidence . In other words, this interpretation 
violates the tommiJt.at.ivity axiom (6). This demonstration will 
help motivate the proba.bilistic interpretations presented later. 
Consider two pieces or evidence which bear on the same 
hypothesis. 
Suppose p(H) = .4. If we first. update the probability or H with 
the positive evidence and then the negative evidence using (15), 
we get. 
.7 = (P(HIE•) . . 4) I (1 . . 4) 
• .  5 = (p(HjE+) . 82) I .82 
==> 
==> 
P(HIE+) = . 82 
p(HIE·E·) : .41 
However, if we first update with the negative evidence and then 
the positive evidence, we get 
• 5 = (p(HIE·) . 4) I .4 ==> 
.7 = (P(HjE+) . . 2) I (1 .. 2) ==> 
p(HjE·) = .2 
P(HjE-E+) = .76 
So we see that p(H IE+ E-) < > p(HjE-E+ ). In other words, the 
origin a I int.erpret.at.ion leads to the unappealing result that the 
beli ef Jl; a hypothesis is dependent on the order In which 
evidence for the hypothesis is considered. 
A probabilistic interpretation 
The soune or non-commutativity can be traced to tbe lack of 
symmtt.ry in .Joric· From (15) we see that positive evidence is 
mtasur�d relatin to the distance between 1 and p(H), while 
negative evidence is measured relative to the distance between 0 
and p(H) (see also figure 3 below). In order to avoid this 
as�·mmetry, it seems reasonable to map p(H jE) and p(H) into 
thf interval (·oo, oo). Th is gives some "elbow room" In which 
to combine .4's without asymmetries. In fact, the obvious 
choice for a "certainty factor" In the Infinite space Is simply 
the distance between the mapped points of the posterior and 
prior probabilities. In this case, we can combine these certainty 
factors by adding them. However, there is now the problem 
that certainty fa�tors in this space range from ·oo to oo. To fix 
this problem, we map these numbers into the interval (·1, I) 
with a funct.ion that preserves the .4 properties. This Is shown 
diagrammatically In figure 2. Note that we are explicitly 
representing prior evidence • for reasons that will become clear 
0 
-1 
Ficure 2: The mapping scheme for generating 
probabilistic interpretations 
shortly. However, this is not necessary given thf modularity 
axiom or .J 's, ( 4). 
Referring to figure 2, the function F maps the posterior and 
prior probabilities in the interval (0,1} into (·oo , oo). Certainty 
factors in the th is Infinite space, denoted .400, are then 
constructed by subtracting the mapped posterior from the 
mapped prior 
.4""(H,E,e) = F(p(HjEe)) · F(p(Hje)) (16) 
Finally, the function G maps the .400's into the interva.l (·1, 1). 
That is, 
.1(H,E,e) = G{.1""(H,E,e)). (17) 
·we cannot choose the functions F and G arbitrarily because 
the axioms of certainty factors and the requirements for a 
probabilistic interpr etation must be respected. Later we will 
see that there is no freedom in the choice for F. In particular, 
F(x) = ln(xl1-x) (18) 
There is more freedom in the choice for G however. We will 
fee that any G which satisfies 
G(x) = ·G(· x) 
G aonotonic increasing (19) 
G(oo) = 1 
will generate a probabilistic Interpretation. 
In this section, we will examine the probabilistic 
Interpretation gen era.ted by 
(20) 
It Is easy to show that this choice for G sa.tlsfles (19). 
Combining (16) • (20), we get 
p(H jEe) · p(Hje) .41(H,E,e) = ···················-·········--·· (21) 
p(H!Ee) • P(Hje) · 2P(HjEe)p(H!e) 
or, more simply, 
p(HJE) · p(H) 
.11(H,E) = ···············-··-·····-·· (22) 
p(HjE) • p(H) · 2P(HjE)p(H) 
As mentioned earlier, we denote a particular probabilistic 
interprft.ation with a subscript. We also need to subscript the 
function G since any function satisfying (10) produces a 
probabilistic Interpretation. There Is no need to subscript .J00 
beca.use F is fixed. 
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The parallel rombination function for A1 can be derived from 
the combination function for A00• Recall that A"" was 
con�trurted such that it's parallel combination function Is 
simply addition. That is, 
(23) 
This is also clear from (16). In combination with (17), this gives 
Gl-
l(..ll(H. El�)) = Gl-l(..li(H, El)) + Gl-l(..li(H. �)) 
and since 
el-
l 
= ln(t<x/1-x) 
we get 
--------------- = ------------- -------------
1 - .11(H.E1�) l - ..31(H.E1) 1 - A1(H.�) 
(25) 
(26) 
ft. is straightforward to show that A1 with the combination 
funrt ion (26) satisfies the basic axioms and the axioms of 
parallel combination as well as the requirements of a 
probabili�tic int.erpretat.ion. ·we say that ..:\1 i11 a probabilistic 
interpret at ion for certainty factors. 
The numerator or ..:\1 clearly demonstrates that It is a 
probability update. In fact, A1 is not too different from the 
original definition of certainty factors. The numerators are the 
same \\'hi!e J.1 seems to have a more complicated denominator. 
To get a better feel for A1• we can rewrite (22) as 
p(HIE) - p(H) 
A1 (H,E) 
= -------
-------------------------
--
-
p(H)(l - p(H)E)) + p(H)E)(l - p(H)) 
(27) 
Figure 3 d epicts Aoric and A1 geometrically. Note the 
symmetry In the denominator of A1 that Is lacking In the 
original interpretation . 
{ 
• 
f(ll ,mEl 
A: -- I I • 
,ml IO(DI f(.l f(IIIEl 
6-wi I _,. t----... 1
• 
�lf(ll 
-- _, fol-...... '--1 
• 
,ml f(B!El 
(I I I 
_,. . - tlul ,ml f(llll:l 
I ....., 
• 
II(IIGJ > p(Rl 
p(RI>p(lll!l 
�·-· ) 
I I 
- I  
,ml f(IIJEl 
I I I 
I 
Figure 3: A geometrical comparison of Aorir and A1 
A comparison of the eombinstion functions 
It Is interesting to compare the parallel combination fun�tlon 
we have derived for .:11, (26), with the combination function 
used In MYCIN. (I). Altho ugh both functions obey the axioms 
of parallel combination . there is no reason to expect that the 
two functions are equivalent. It turns out, however, that. they 
are clo�e. In figure 4, the two functions are plotted for 
CF(H.E1) = .:11(H.E1) = 0.5. The two curves never differ by 
more than a few percent. It can e asilY be shown that the two 
combination functions differ the most when 
CF(H,E1) 
= 
A1(H,E1) approaches 1 
and 
CF(H.�) = A1(H.�) = -1 + (1 - CF(H.E1))/2 
In this case, CF(H.E1E2) approaches -1/2 while A(H.E1E2) 
approaches -l/3. 
QI(H.E2l 
A l(H.E2l 
Figure 4: A comparison of the parallel combination function 
used in MYCIN and the parallel combination 
function for .:11 
Relationship to Bayes' theorem 
In this section, we will show that the probabilistic 
Interpretation A1 is consistent with Bayes' theorem under the 
assumption of conditional independence. To begin. consider 
Bayes' theorem for updating the probability of a hypothesis H 
given prior e\'idence e and new evidence E: 
p(EJHe)p(Hie) 
p(HjEe) = ------------­
p(Eje) 
(28) 
The corresponding formula for the negation of the hypothesis, 
-H. is 
p(EJ•He) p(-Hi e) 
------------
---
P(Eie) 
p ("HI Ee) 
Dividing (28) by (29) we get 
P(HiEe) p(EjHe) p(Hie) 
P("H(Ee) P(E/.He) p("Hie) 
Now the odds of some event x, denoted O(x), Is just 
O(x) 
= 
p(x)/(1 - p(1)) 
so that (30) can be written as 
p(E/He) 
O(H[Ee) = 
---
-
--
-
- O(H[e) 
p(E/-He) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
Note that this form or Bayes' theorem was derived without 
assuming conditional independence of evidence. 
Given (16) and (18) we can write 
A""(H,E,e) = ln(O(HJEe)(O(Hie)) 
or using (31 ). 
.:100(H ,E ,e) = ln(p(EiHe)jp(E[-He)) 
13 
(32) 
(33) 
FurtlJt•rmore, with G1 given by (20) we see that 
..:l1(H,E,e) = (p(E/He)fp(E/"He) - 1) /(P(EjHe) /P(Ej"He) + 1) (34) 
or 
p(EjHe)/P(Ej"He) = (..:l1(H,E,e) • 1) /(..:l1(H,E,e) - 1) . (ss) 
Now a.ssumt' that E and • are conditionally Independent given 
H and -H. That Is 
p(E/He) = p(E/H) and p(E/"He) = p(Ej"H) (36) 
for all • which does not entail E. Given this assumption, we see 
that the modularity axiom for ..:l's, (4), Is satisfied. Also, under 
assumption (36) we can write Bayes' theorem for two pieces or 
evidence as 
P(H/E1�) p(E1�/H) P(H) p (E1/H) p (�jH) P(H) 
--------- = --------- ----- = -------- -------- ----- (37) 
p("HIE1f:!) p (E1f:!/"H) p ("H) P(E1/"H) p (�/-H) p ("H) 
Substituting (3S) into (37) then gives the parallel combination 
function for ..:l1, (26). 
Tht'refore, the probablllstic Interpretation ..:l1 for certainty 
ra�t ors is consistent with Ba.yes' theorem with the assumption 
or �onditional Independence of evidence on H and Its negation. 
Later wt will see that the axioms of certainty factors and the 
requirements or a probabilistic Interpretation for certainty 
ra�t.ors mandates the conditional Independence assumption. 
Relationship to the likelihood ratio 
The quantity p(EJH)/p(EJ-H) Is commonly called the 
likelihood ratio and written >.(H,E). With this shorthand, we 
ran write (31 )  as 
O(H I E) 
------ = >.(H , E) . 
O(H) 
(38) 
This equation 15 oft.en called the odds-likelihood form of Bayes' 
theorem. Under the assumption of conditional Independence, 
the parallel combination function for ).(H,E) Is simple 
multiplication: 
(39) 
This follows from the definition of lambda, (38) and (37). The 
parallel combination function for the logarithm of the likelihood 
ratio, ln!>.(H,E)]. which Is Identical to ..:l00(H,E) Is just addition. 
That Is, 
(40) 
This desirable property or the log-likelihood ratio was first 
noted by Peirce In 187817• He called the quantity lni).(H.E)j the 
"weight of evidence" for a. hypothesis and argued tha.t It Is a. 
natural form for the expression a.nd processing or beliefs. This 
proptrty or the log-likelihood r&tio was also discovered 
Independently by Turln&11, Good"·10 who also called them 
" weights of tvldence" a.nd Mlnsky21. The additive property of 
the log-likelihood ratio also revea.ls a striking resemblance to 
the ad hot scoring scheme of INTERNIST·l. Indeed, It Is not 
surprizing tha.t such a simple and powerful method ror 
reasoning with uncertainty has been "discovered" ma.ny times. 
The likelihood ratio Is used explicitly In several experts 
syst.ems. For example, the GLASGOW DYSPEPSIA system 
um ln>.!(H.E)j22 and PROSPECTOR uses >.(H,E)14• 
PROSPECTOR Is of special Interest because Duda, one of Its 
designers, noticed a. similarity between ).(H,E) and certainty 
fa�tors
1
1• 21. In particular, he showed tha.t the combination 
run�Uon for the quantity >.(H,E)-1/>.(H,E)+l, which he called 
C(H,E). Is quite similar to the MYCIN parallel combination 
function (I). From equation (34), we aee that C(H,E) Is equal to 
..:l1(H.E) and so the combination function for C Is just (26). 
Duda considered the combination function for C to be an 
approximation or the combination function for CF. The 
concepts developed In this paper suggest tbat the one Is no 
"better" tha.n the other; both satisfy the axioms of parallel 
combination. 
Other probabilistic: Interpretations 
The mapping scheme developed above can be used to create 
an Infinite number of valid Interpretations. Recall tha.t. any G 
which satisfies (19) will generate a. probabilistic Interpretation. 
One legitimate choice for G Is of special Interest. It Is easy to 
show that. the map 
{ ln(t/1-x) 
G(x) = 
tn(1•x) 
X >= 0 
X <= 0 
corresponding to the probabilistic Interpretation 
p (HjE) - p (H) 
p (HjE) (1 - p (H) )  
p (H) > p(HjE) 
P(H/E) - P(H) 
------- ---------
P(H) (t - P(H/E)) 
gives the MYCIN pa.ra.llel combination function c:rad/JI.• That 
Is. there Is a. proba.blllstlc Interpretation for certainty factors 
which yields the combination function used by MYCIN. We 
will not dwell on this mapping since we have shown that 
dlfferencel5 between the ..:l1 and MYCIN parallel combination 
functions ar� small. Also, the latter mapping Is more difficult 
to a.naiyze and work with. 
Consldtr the followln& set or choices for G. 
exl/n - 1 
Gn(•) = --------­
xl/n 
e 
• 1 
n = 1, 2, 3, . . .  
It Is easy to check that each G8 produces a valid probab!llstic 
Interpretation 
(D(H/E) /O(H) )lln- 1 
..:l8(H,E) = ------------------- . (41) 
(O(HiE)/D(H))1/n • 1 
The parallel combination function corresponding to G1 Is given 
by• 
{In [1•..:ln(H,E1�) /1-..:ln(H,E1�)]}1 = 
{In [ 1 •An (H,E1) /1-..:l1(H,E1) ]  }1 (42) 
• {tn[t•..:l8(H.�) /1-..:l1(H.�))}1. 
As n approaches infinity, the combination function tends to 
select the certainty factor with the la.r&est absolute value. 
Thus, the combination function can take on different 
qua.lltat.lve behaviors depending on the probabilistic 
lnt.t>rpretation." In the next section. we will examine an 
0 Thio wu lirol aol*d in a papor h)' Hr.jeklt. 
• 
This exam pit Is cjvon in a paper h)' 6pl•a•lballer1• 
• 
Wo will lift lat.or lhal G all'trll lbe oequnlial rombiaalloa fundioD u well. 
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important implicatron of this fact. Here, we mention that (42) 
provides an explanation for a cont'ern that the creators of 
certainty factors bad about the behavior of their parallel 
combination function ( 1 ). They felt that combinations of 
positive evidence approached certainty (CF=l) too qulckly1. 
Perhaps they bad the probabilistic Interpretation A11 (n large) 
in mind. 
Eliciting certainty ractors f'rom experts 
Ctrtainty factors are often elicited from experts with rather 
vague phrases like: "Given E how strongly do you believe In 
H?" or "How strongly does E confirm H?." For example, these 
phrases were used during the construction of early versions or 
the MYCIN knowledge base2�. Undoubtedly, the lack or a clear 
opaat.ional meaning for certainty factors Is responsible for the 
use of imprecise phrases such as these. Moreover, such 
imprecision is troubling in light of the fact that different 
probabilistic interpretations can dictate parallel combination 
functions with qualitatively different behaviors. However, once 
certainty factors are given a. probabilistic interpretation, It is a 
st raightrorward 1 ask to elicit them precisely. 
Equal ions (32) and (33) show that the ratio O(H(E)/O(H) or 
the equivalent ratio p(EIHJ/p(Ei-H) is sufficient to determine 
..1 for an)· probabilistic Interpretation. This suggests two 
met hods for eliciting ce.rtainty factors. The first Is to elicit 
p(E!Hl and p(E[-Hl separately and then use (34) to calculate 
.:l(H.E). The second is to elicit p(HJE) assuming some p(H) and 
th�n use (!!2). The second method has an Interesting special 
case. If we let p(H) = 1/2, (22) gives 
.:l(H,E) = 2p(HJE) - 1 
That is, suppose we ask the expert to imagine th�ot tbe prior 
probability of some hypothesis is 1/2. Then we ask him for the 
posterior probability of the hypothesis given a piece of evidence. 
(43) states that t.his task of "starting" at 1/2 and giving a 
posterior probability is equiYalent to the task of "starting" at 0 
and giving a t'erta.inty fact9r In l-1,1]. This is shown 
diagrammatically in figure 5. 
0 l/2 ·I 0 
Figure 5: A correspondence between eliciting probabilities 
and elicit.ing certainty factors 
It should be mentioned that elidt-ing probabilities Is not a 
trivial task. Errors of bias are a major problem. For example, 
people tend to anchor on prior probabilitiesli.S and tend to be 
consHvative near o and 128 (i.e., when probabilities are near 
one, the y are underestimated and when probabilities are near 
zero, they are overestimated). There are techniques for 
overcoming biases25, 27, 2e, 28 but such a discussion is not 
appropriate here. 
Completeness of the mapping scheme 
Earlier, we saw that It Is possible to generate an Infinite 
number of probabilistic Interpretations for certainty factors 
with the map F given by (18) and the map G defined by (17). 
In this sfct.ion, we show that this mapping scheme can generate 
all probabilistic Interpretations. In other words, given any 
quantity which satisfies the basic axioms or certainty factors 
and the axir;>ms of parallel combination as well as the 
requirements for a probabilistic Interpretation, there Is an F 
and G whkh g�nera.tes it. 
Consider the second half of the mapping scheme, (17). It 
turns out that certainty factors. as defined by the axioms, form 
a mat.hematical structure called a.n ordered commutative �roup. 
This was first notfd by Hajek12. A consequence of this fact Is 
that given any quantity A and associated parallel combination 
function which sat.isfies tbe axioms, there Is a function -r such 
t-hat 
-r(A(H,E1E:!)) = -y(A(H,E1)) • 'Y(A(H,E:!)) 
where -y must satisfy 
-r(x) = --y(-x) 
'Y •onotonic increasing ( -4-4) 
'Y( I ) = oo 
In ot.her words, L\(H,E1) and L\(H,E2) can combined by first 
mapping them to another space with the function -y, adding 
them in this new space, and then mapping the sum back to the 
original space with -,·1. However, -r·1 corresponds to what we 
have been calling G and -y(L\(H,E)) is just ..:100(H,E). Therefore, 
given a quantity wbicb satisfies the axioms of certainty factors, 
we will be able to find a G such that (17) and (23) are satisfied. 
The requirements on choices for G, (19), follow directly from 
(44). 
Now consider thf first half of the mapping scheme, (16). First 
note that the function G bas an inverse because it Is monotonic . 
Therefore, we t'an rewrite the first requirement for a 
probabilistic interpretation, (12), in terms of A00• That Is, we 
require that there is some function f such that 
..:1""(H,E,e) = f(p(HJEe), p(H/e)). (45} 
But (45) and (23) together Imply that 
f (P (H/ E,E,). p (H)) = f(p (HI E,E:!). p (H/ E,))•f(p (H J EJ} .P (H)). 
In other words, we know f satisfies 
r(x,z) = r(x,y) • r(y,z) 
for <>•I A, )' , and z between 0 and I. Since f Is smooth, there is 
some function ¢ such that 
f (x,y) = I(Y) - ¢(x) .  
However, it is clear from (16) and (45) that the function ' i� 
just what we have been calling F. In other words, the 
relationship between p(H !El and p(H) and L\00 must be given by 
(16). Combining this result with the above we see that the 
mapping scheme, (16) and (17), can generate all probabilistic 
Interpretations. 
The assumption of conditional independence 
ln the appendix. constraints for the function F similar to 
those for G In the previous section are derived. These 
constraints are intimately related to the assumption of 
condit-ional indep�ndence, (36). In fact, Is shown that If the 
desiderata of parallel combination are to be respected, the only 
reasonable assumption to make about the dependencies amon� 
pi�t'es or evidence which bear on a hypothesis is that or 
conditional independence. 
In this section, we examine two important restrictions placed 
on the use of �ertalnty factors by the assumption of conditional 
lndependettce. The first restriction is that certainty ractors 
cannot be used to manage uncertainty In an Inference net when 
any set or mutually exclusive a.nd exhaustive hypotheses in the 
net has more than two elements. To see this, suppose H1, H2, 
and H3 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. A problem 
arises wh�n we assume that evidence is conditionally 
Independent on the Hi's and their negation. For example, 
. 
. 
In t fortbrominr Ptp�r, we will. s�ow tbat rerttioty fo.oton nn be seoertlized •n tueh a way that- thf' h11bly restru�t.1ve a.uumption• diseuned iD this 1eet.ion ea.D b• avoid•d. 
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suppos� �vidence Is conditionally Independent on -H,. That Is, 
p (E j "H3e 1 ) � p (E j "H3e2) 
Now suppose that e1 disproves H2 and e2 disproves H1 . 
Assuming that evidence is independent given H1 and H2, we get 
P (EjH1 ) � P (E jH1e1) � p (E jH2e2) � p (E JH,) 
which is not true in general. 
The stcond rtstriction concerns two other types or 
comb in at ion defined in the certainty factor model. Those 
familiar wit.h MYCIN may recall that the system uses "fuzzy 
set operators" to handle conjunctions and disjunctions of 
PViden�t in a rule prtmise. It Is not very difficult to show that 
thtse functions violate the assumption or conditional 
lndtpt'Odt'nce. Therefore, these combinations must be avoided 
in order to adhere to the desiderata. 
Sequential combination 
Now Itt us turn our attent.ion to sequential combination. 
Rtcall, that one hypothesis can serve as evidence for another. 
Therefore, evidence for a hypothesis may Itself be uncertain. 
As mentioned earlier, the simplest case can be represented as 
follows 
.l(E ,E' )  .l(H ,E) 
E '  ----------> E -----------> H 
whtrt' E' is certain and E and H may not be certain. We are 
int erested In constructing the single rule 
E '  - - - - - - - - - - > H 
with certainty factor �(H,E'). 
\\'hat properties are required of sequential comblna.tlon? 
t'nfort unately, no desiderata concerning sequential combination 
were given in the original work so a set of axioms that seem 
simplt and intuitively appealing are Introduced. 
The first three axioms concern the value or �(H,E') when 
when .l(E.E') takes on the special values -1 ,  0, and 1. We 
require that. 
i f  � (E , E ' )  = 1 then �(H ,E ' ) : �(H ,E) , 
i f  .l(E , E ' )  = -1 then �(H,E ') = � (H, "E) 1nd 
i f  ol(E ,E ' )  
= 
0 then �(H , E ' ) = 0 .  
(46) 
In the first case, E' proves E with certainty, In the second, E' 
disproves E with certainty and in the third, E' says nothing 
about E. In the stcond case, It is clear that another certainty 
factor, .l(H.-E). must. be associated with every IF-THEN rule. 
That is. it is nerrssary to know the update for H when E is 
false. From (2) we see that in MYCIN, CF(H,E') is 0 whenever 
CF(E,E') = -1 . Thus, MYCIN Is Implicitly assuming 
CF(H ........ E) = 0 for every rule. We will return to this point 
shortly. 
The fourth axiom states that �(H,E') is a function of only the 
cert a inty fa<.'tors .l(H.E). �(H.-E) and �(E,E'). Informally, we 
want the net update to depend only on some combination of the 
individual rule updates. The final requirement of the sequential 
combinat.lon function Is that .:l(H,E') Is monotonic with respect 
to �(E.E'). 
Before doing a formal derivation, let us consider sequential 
updating on more Intuitive grounds. Consider the following 
expression which follows from the definition or conditional 
probability. 
(47) 
In order to satisfy the fourth axiom of sequential propagation, 
we assume 
p (H J E , E ' )  � p (H j E} 1nd p(H j "E, E ') = p(Hj "E) .  
Jr. this <.'ase, (47) becomes 
p (H j E ' )  = p (H j E)p (E j E ') 
• 
p (H j "E) p ("E j E ') (48) 
This formula Is represented graphically In figure G. 
J(BIE') 
p(B!E) 
+ 
p(B) 
+ 
p(BrE) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -� 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_ 
/
 I 
• + p(E) _,. l p(EIE') 
Fl.ure 8: Sequential updating in terms of 
absolute probabilities 
Before we know E', H and E are at their prior values, p(H) and 
p(E), respectively." The evidence E' then updates the 
probability of E to p(E jE') which changes the probability or H 
to p(H IE') (see the arrows In the above figure). In other words, 
there is a relationship between the updates .:l(H,E') and 
4(E.E'). 
We now consider the formal deriva.tlon of this relationship. 
Inst.ead of generating an expression for �(H,E') for some 
particular probabilistic Interpretation, it Is convenient to derive 
a relationship bttween t.be likelihood ratios 
>. (H ,E ' )  = p (E ' jH) /p (E ' j "H) 
>. (H,E) = p (E jH) /P (E J "H) 
>. (H , "E) � p("E JH) /p ("E j "H) 
>. (E , E ' )  = p (E ' j E) /p (E' \"E) 
( 49) 
(so) 
(51) 
(52) 
The expression for any particular probabilistic Interpretation 
can then be computed from the relation 
�(H ,E) : G( l n (>. (H, E) ) ) . 
We begin with two expansions analogous to (48). 
p (E ' jH) 
= II (E ' / E)P(E /H) • p (E ' j "E)p ("E /H) 
p (E ' j "H) 
= 
p (E ' j E) p (E j "H) • p (E' j "E) p ("E j "H) 
Dividing the first equation by the second we &et 
p (E ' j E)p (E jH) 
• p (E ' \ "E)p("E\H) 
>. (H ,E ' ) = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
P (E ' j E)p (E j "H) • P (E ' j "E) p ("E j "H) 
(53) 
(54) 
Now we can divide both numerator and denominator by 
p(E'j-E) and use p(EjH) + p(-E!H) = 1 to &et 
• 
Nolo &bat (48} impli" 
p(ll = p (I IE)p(E) • p(l i -E)p("E) 
10 that tho two priors, p(H) and p(E), caDDot 1M 1pecitted illdepeodntly. Thil 
lod &o problomo ID PROSPECTOR becaue experto wen forced to provide prion 
and oft-en did IO inronsist•ut)yt•. Instead of nquiriDI eoneisteDt prion, 
PROSPECTOR arrommodatod tho iaeoarilt .. cill b)' a11D1 a aoa-Ba)'erlau 
updatinc orbemo. In this papor, we derive expn11ioa1 nlaliDI probabili&y 
upliattt and, In doia1 so, avoid tbe10 lacoarilleacieo. 
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X(E ' j E)p (E j H) • 1 - p (E j H) 
(55) >. (H , E ' ) = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . 
>.(E ' j E)P (WH) • 1 - P (E j "H) 
Next. we use (50) and (51) to express p(EIHl and p(Ej-H) In 
terms of >.(H,E) and >.(H.-E). 
1 - X (H, "E) 
p (E j H) = X (H , E) - - - - ·--:--- - - - - -
. >. (ll . E) - >.(II , "E) 
1 - >.(H ,  "E) 
p (E j "H) = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ­
>. (H ,E) - >. (H . "E) 
Combining t hesr results with (55) we get the sequential 
combinat ion function in trrms of >.'s: 
>. (E , E ' ) >. (H , E) ( l - >. (H, "E)) • >.(H, "E) (>.(H ,E) - 1) 
>. (H . E ' ) = - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - ---- - - - - - - - - --- --------- - (56) 
>. (E , £ ' ) ( 1 ->. (H , "E)) + ( >. (H , E) - 1 )  
\\'e c a n  derive the sequential combination function for the 
prob� bil ist ic interpretation ..11 by using (53) with G given by 
(�0). The result is 
..11 (H , E ' )  
- 2  ..11 (H, E) ..11 (H , "E) ..1 1 (E , E ') 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (?1) 
(..11 (H , E) - ..11 (H . "E) )  - ..1 1 (E , E ' ) (..11 (H,E) + ..11 (H . "E) ) 
It is easy to show that (57) satisfies the axioms of sequential 
combination. 
The sequential combination function for ..11 is plotted in 
figure 7 for ..11(H,E) = .9 and ..11(H,-E) = -.05, - .25 , and - .9. 
MYCIN 's sequential combination function Is also plotted for 
comparison. The plot reveals considerable disagreement 
between t-he two functions. When I..11(H,-E)I Is near 
j.l1(H.E)j, the two functions are close for .ll(E,E') greater than 0 
but diverge as .ll(E,E') becomes more negative. When 
A (Hj) • ·.05 I 
A !Hil • ·. 25 
l 
A (Hj) • -.9 l 
A 1  (B,B') 
-l 
Fi�ure 7: The sequential combination function for ..11 
..11(H.-E) is near 0 (a.s Is assumed by MYCIN), the two 
functions are close for .ll(E,E') less than 0 but diverge as 
.ll(E.E') becomes more positive ' Therefore we see that the 
axioms of sequent-ial combination accommodate probabilistic 
in terpretations whereas the particular sequential combination 
function used in MYCIN cannot have a. probabilistic 
Interpretation. Since well-und�d probabilistic quantities 
can satisfy the Intuitively appealing axioms of sequential 
combinat.fon. there is no reason to retain the original CF 
combination function. 
Finally, let us consider the differences between the MYCJN 
and probabilistic combination functions in the example given 
earlier In this paper concerning the person who likes parties and 
solo backpacking trips. From the above discussion, it should be 
clear that we need to specify a certainty factor for the link 
"EXTROVERT - - - - - - - - >  DOES SOCIAL WORK 
Suppose t h is certainty factor is - .4. In this case, if we know a 
person likes to go to parties and also likes solo backpacking 
trips, then the increase in belief that he does social work is 
..11 = .2. This is close to CF = .24 calculated earlier. In fact, 
the difference is due to parallel combination only since the 
sequential combination functions for CF and ..11 are identical 
when ..11(H.E) = -..11(H,-E) and .ll(E,E') is greater than 0. 
However, suppose we only know that a person likes solo 
backpacking trips. In this case, we get CF = 0 and ..11 = - .2 
for the change in belief that he does social work. We see that 
the MYCIN combination function is ignoring the Information 
contained in the link pictured above. 
Diseussion 
Our analysis raises two important questions. 
Givw the corre11pondence 6etu.oeen certaint11 factorll and 
pro6a6ilities, whv uBe eertaintv factoril at all.i Or more 
preciselv, u·hv retain the di11tinction 6etween eertaintv factorll 
ond probabilitie&f 
One possible answer to this question Is that the concept of 
certainty factors, or more generally, the concept or a 
probability update is important with respect to the user-system 
interaction. For example, the concept of an update can be used 
to assist in explanation. If a user were interested in knowing 
why a particular hypothesis was being considered, an expert 
system could display all evidence relevant to the hypothesis and 
the updates associated with each piece of evidence. In fact, 
"weight of evidence," a particular type of update mentioned 
earlier in this paper , Is used by the GLASGOW DYSPEPSIA 
expert system In this way to explain its reasoning to the user22. 
Updates can also be used for entering data into an expert 
system. To il lust rat e this, consider an expert system for the 
diagnosis of liver disease which has in its inference net the node 
"patient drinks a lcohol frequently" with possible values " true" 
and "false . "  Suppose the program requests that the physician 
enter a value for this node. The physician then presumably 
asks the patient whether or not he drinks frequently. Based on 
the pat.ient.'s answer and how he answers Jt, the physician may 
not just want to enter "true" or "false" but express his 
uncertainty about the status of the node. It seems appropriate 
for the physician to re lay his uncertainty as an update rather 
than an absolute probability. A simple argument for this can 
be made when the inference net has a tree structure. First note 
t.hat In a tree network , prior probabi lities for all non-root nodes 
can be calculated from the prior of the root node. Jn 
particular, the prior probabilities of the leaf or data nodes are a. 
• 
There is a oimple intuitive expl&nation for &be 1harp eoneavity or the 
sequential eombination funetion for a1 as .:l(H,-E) approaebel o. This oituation 
eorresponds to the ease wbue p(H) is near p(HJ-E). ID this oitualion, we oee 
from firure 8 that p(E) is nnr 0. Sinee E io bichly unlikely, it takes a olroll& 
posith•e update on E to raise it• probability t.o a value t.bat will alt.er t.be 
probability of H sicnifieanlly. 
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function of t.he certainty factors or updates assigned to the 
network by some expert. Therefore, even though a user may 
agree with some specified prior for the root node, his priors for 
data nodes may not be consi!tent with those of the system 
because he may not have the !arne Information that Is 
cont.a.ined in the net. Thus, if the physician simply reports an 
absolute probability for the status of the data node after the 
pa.t.ient. reports that be does not drink frequently, the resulting 
updates in the net may be Inaccurate due to the dltrerences 
between the physician's and sy!tem's prior probability tor the 
node. A more accurate propatation of uncertaint.y occurs If the 
physician enttrs an update for the data node which can then be 
propagated according to the prescriptions or this work. Note 
that. the physician does not have to calculate an update • jn his 
head." He may simply enter both his prior and posterior 
proba.bilities for the node from which the system can calculate 
the update. 
\\'hv  i4 Ml"CIN ao aucceufulf 
In th is papt'r , we discussed several restrictions that a system 
must satisfy before the use or certainty factors is consistent 
with the desiderata. However, MYCIN violates some or these 
re�t rict ions. For example, the system contains :sets or mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses with more than two 
e lements. In addition, certa.inty factors were elicited without a 
dear opnat ional definition. In fact, they were elicited with the 
not ion that they roughly corresponded to positive predictive 
value (p(H(E)), an absolute quantity1.  However, the system 
performs as well as experts In the field. Perhaps detailed 
ronsiderat.lons or uncertainty is not critical to the system's 
performance.  Indeed, a sensitivity analysis or MYCIN's 
knowledgt> bast' carried out by Cooper and Clancey28 revealed 
th a t  t h e  system's performance did not depend strongly on 
cha.ngt>s in rule certainty factors. It would be interesting to 
study t h e  performance or a other systems using certainty 
fact or� with resptct to systematic violations of the restrictions 
outlined In this paper. 
Summary and conclusions 
A redefinit ion of certainty factors in terms of the original 
desiderata has btt>n proposed. The axioms or certainty factors 
have been examined in detai l and It has been emphasized that 
t he�e axioms reflt>ct the notion that certainty factors represent 
a belief update. Jt, bas bt>en shown that this redefinition 
accommodates an Infinite number or probabilistic 
interpretations for certainty factors. These interpretations, in 
tu rn, baVt' provided useful Insights Into necessary and sufficient 
assumpt.ions for propagating certainty factors through an 
inftrtnce net. In particular, It has been shown that evidence 
which bears on any hypothesis in the net must be conditionally 
Ind ependent on the hypothesis and Its negation. The analysis 
has made it clear that certainty factors should be elicited from 
experts In a precise fashion and straightforward methods for 
doing this have been presented. Specific Improvements in the 
methods for sequential combination have also been presented. 
It Is bopt>d that this discussion has clarified much of the 
mystery surrounding certainty factors. 
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Appendix: the auumptlon of eondltlonal 
Independence 
B�fore examining t.be IISsumptlon of conditional Independence, 
we wlll derive some general constraints on the function F which 
follow directly from the basic and parallel combination axioms 
and and the requirements for a probabilistic Interpretation. 
Using the definition of G. (17), and tile restrictions on this 
function ( 19), the second requirement or a probabilistic 
Interpretation (13) becomes 
Similarly, the third requirement (14) becomes 
.4""(H , E) = oo i ff (p(H ! E) = 1 and p(H) <> 0) 
.400(H , E) = -oo i ff (p(H J E) = 0 and p(H) <> 1) . 
These requiremtnts along with the definition of F, (16), give the 
following restrictions on F: 
F aonoton i c  i ncreas i ng 
F( I )  ,; oo 
F (o) ,; -oo . 
\\'e are now ready to examine the relationship between the 
assumpt.Joo of condit ional independence and further restrictions 
on the function F. \Ve begin the analysis by showing that If the 
function F Is givtn by ( 18}, then all evidence which bears 
directly on a hypothesis Is conditionally Independent of the 
hypothesis and Its negation. As we showed earlier, when F is 
a:iven by ( 18), the equations (16) and (31) give 
.i"" (H , E , e) = l n (p (E. J He)fp(Ej"He) ) 
(ste (33)). Since the function G has an Inverse, we can write 
the modularity axiom (4) as fol lows: 
..:1""(H , E , e) = ..:1""(H , E) 
for all e which does not entail E. Using (33) and the fact that 
the log function has an Inverse, we get 
P (E JHe) p ( E J H) 
(58) 
P (E J "He) P (E f "H) 
for all • which does not entail E. Note that (58) is almost the 
requirement or conditional Independence. 
Wben we considered sequential combination, we saw that 
every rule In an Inference net of the form IF E THEN H must 
be assoclat.ed wlt.h a certainty factor ..:1(H.-E), the change In 
belief or H given the a61ence of E. as well as a certainty factor 
..:1(H,E). Given this, we get the companion requirement or (58) 
p("E (He) p("E( H) 
- - - - - - - - -
= 
-------- (59) 
P ("E i "He) p ("Ej"H) 
for all • which does not entail -E. From (58} and (59) It 
follows that either 
p(E)He) = p(E ) "He) (60) 
for all • which does not entail E or Its negation, or that 
p(EJHe) = p(E JH) and p (E J "He) = p(EJ "H) (61) 
for all • which does not entail E or its n egation. (60) Implies 
..1(H,E) = 0 which means that E has no affect on H. Therefore. 
when F Is given by (18), evidence which has any bearing on a 
· hypot.htsls must be con d itionally Independent on the hypothesis 
and Its negation. 
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The converse is also true. That is, if we assume conditional 
independence. F Is essentially given by ( 18}. To see this, first 
note that since F is monotonic increasing, we can write 
.l""(H , E , e) 
l n (f ' (p (H ! Ee) / 1-P(H ! Ee) ) )  - l n (f ' (p (Hie)/1-p (H ie)))  (62) 
l n (f ' (O (H i Ee) ) /f ' (O (H i e) ) )  
where f' Is a monoton ical ly increasing, smooth function. In 
conjunction with the axiom of modularity, (4), this gives 
f ' (O (H i Ee) ) /f ' (O (H ! e) )  = f ' (O(H I E) ) /f ' (O(H) ) (63) 
for all e which does not entail E. Now suppose all evidence for 
some hypothesis is con dit ional ly independent on the hypothesis 
and its negation. l'sing this assumption and (31) we get 
O (H I Ee) /O (H ! e) = O (ti J E) /O (H) (64) 
ror all  e which does not entail E. (63) and (64) together Imply 
t h a t  
f ' ( x ) = A x" A ,  a > 0 
which means 
F ( x )  = a J n ( x/ 1 - x )  a >  0 (65) 
Since the factor a can be incorporated into the definition of G, 
we see that the assumption of conditional independenc e 
amoun ts to choosing F to be the function given by ( 18). 
From the above analysis we see that the dependencies among 
evidence given hypothesis is directly related to the choice for 
F. In particular, if we assume that F is not given by (65), then 
we must assume that all evidence which bears d irectly on a 
hypothesis Is conditionally dependent in some uniform way 
det erm ined by the exact choice for F. The assumption or 
uniform conditional dt'pendence seems far less attractive than 
the assumpt ion of conditional Independence. Therefore, we add 
the con d i t ional independence assumption to the requirements 
tor a probabilist ic interpretation keeping in mind that there is 
no other reason able a lternative. 
As mentioned in the text, it was the intention of the creators 
of cert ainty factors to require " modularity" since this would 
ra c i J it.ate the constru ction of the knowledge base. The above 
analysis makes it clear that " modularity" corresponds to 
conditional independence in the probabilistic sense. 
1 .  
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5. 
References 
Shortliffe, E.H.. and Buchanan, B.G., "A model of 
inexact reasoning in medicine, " 
Bioseienres, No. 23, 1975, pp. 351-379. 
Mathematical 
Cohen, Paul R . ,  Hwriatie Reaaoning A6out 
Vnrertaintv: An Artificial Intelligence Approach, PhD 
d issertation, Computer Science Department, Stanford 
University, August 1 983, Rep. No. STAN-C$-83-986. 
Lindley, D.V., "Scoring rules and the inevitability or 
probability,"  Int.  Stat. Rev., Vol. 50, 1982, pp. 1-26. 
Cheeseman, P., "In defense of probability", To be 
presented at the 9th International Joint Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence 
Pearl. J., "Reverend Bayes on Inference engines: a 
d istributed hierarchical approach," Proceedinga Second 
Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, AAAI, 1982, pp. 133- 1 36. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
1 1 . 
Splegelhalt.er, D.J . ,  "A statistical view or uncertainty i n  
expert systems", Presented a t  Workshop on A I  a.nd 
Stat istics, Bell Laboratories, April 1 1-12 1985 
Cha.rnlak, E.. "The Bayesian basis or common sense 
medical d iagnosis, " Proreedinga of the National 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Washington, 
D .C. , AAAI. 1 983, pp. 70-73. 
Yu, V. L. ,  Fagan, L. M., Wraith,  S. M.,  et al . ,  
"Ant imicrobial Sflection By A Computer: A Blinded 
Eval u at.lon By Infectious Disease Experts," Journal of 
the Ameriran Afedical Association, Vol. 242, No. 1 2, 
1979, pp. 1 279- 1 282. 
Ad ams, J .B. ,  " Probabi l istic reasoning and certainty 
factors, "  Afathematical Biouiences, No. 32, 1976, pp. 
1 77- 1 86. 
Shortliffe. E.H . . "Certainty factors -- a re-evaluation",  
Unpublished int ernal memo 
Duda, R . O . ,  "Alternative forms or Bayes rule for 
d iagnosis," Tech . report, SRI, 1975, Project file 3805 
1 2 .  Hajek, P . ,  "Combining function for certainty degrees i n  
consu lt ing systems, "  Tech. report, Mathematical 
Institute, Prague , 1984 . 
13 .  Horvitz, E . J  . . and Heckerman, D . E . ,  "Confusion between 
be lief updating and absolute belief in artificial 
intelligence research", To be presented at the 
AAAI/IEEE Workshop on Uncertainty and Probability 
in Artifirial Intel ligence 
14.  Duda, R . ,  Hart, P..  and Nilsson, N . ,  "Subjective 
Bayesian methods for · rule-based inference systems," 
Proceedings 1976 National Computer Conference, Vol. 
45, AFIPS, 1 976, pp. 1075- 1082. 
15 .  Pearl, J . ,  "Fusion, propagation, and structuring In 
Bayesian networks", Presented at the Symposium on 
Complexity of Approximately Solved Problems, 
Col umbia University 
16. Shortllffe, E. H.,  "Personal communication". 
17. Peirce, C.S., The probabilitv of induction, Simon an d 
Shuster, 1956, pp. 1341· 1354. 
18 .  Good, I . J . ,  The Bauesian influence, or how to sweep 
8ttbjectiviBm under the carpet, D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1 976, pp. 1 25- 174. 
19.  Good, I . J . ,  Proba6ilif11 and the tveighing of evidence, 
Hafners , New York , 1950. 
20. Good, I .J . ,  "We ight or evidence, corroboration , 
explanatory power. information and the utility or 
experiments," J. R. Statist. Sot:. B, No. 22, 1960, pp. 
319-33 1 . 
21 .  Minsky, M . .  and Selfridge, O.G., Learning in random 
neta, Butterworths, London, 1961 , pp. 335-347. 
1 9  
22. Spiegelbalt.er, D.J., and Kniii-Jones, R.P., "Statistical 
and knowledge-ba.sed approaches to clinical decision­
support systems, with an application In 
ga.stro�nterology," J. R. Stati1t. Soc. A, No. 147, U184. 
pp. 35-77. 
23. Grosof. B., "Evidential confirmation as transformed 
probability", To be presented at the AAAI/IEEE 
Workshop on Uncertainty a.nd Probability In Artificial 
lntelll&ence 
24. Faga.n, L, "Personal communication". 
25. Tversky, A., and Kabneman, D., "Judgement under 
uncertainty: heuristics and biases," Science, Vol. 185, 
1971, pp. 1 124-1 131 . 
26. Edwards, W., et. al., "Special Issue on probabilistic 
Inference," IEEE 7hanuction• on Human Factor� In 
Eledronil'l, Vol. 7, No. 1 ,  1966, . 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Spetzler, C.S., Staell von Holstein, C.S., Fto.dilitv 
encotlin1 in tleciaion onal11•i•, Strate&lc Decisions 
Group, U184, pp. IW3-IJ25. 
Lindley, D.V., Tversk:y, A., and Brown, R.V., "On the 
reconciliation or probability assessments," J. R. Stoti1t. 
Soc. A, 1979, pp. 146-180. 
Buchanan, B.G.,  Shortllffe, E.H., Unccrtaint11 ond 
evidenti•l 1upport, Addison-Wesley, Menlo Park:, 1984, 
cb. 10. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
20 I 
